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POPPING BRITNEY'S PERSONAL SAFETY
BUBBLE: WHY PROPOSED ANTI-PAPARAZZI
ORDINANCES IN LOS ANGELES CANNOT
WITHSTAND FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
By: Gary Wax*
"Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade,
which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery."
- Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis in The Right to Privacy, 1890.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Los Angeles residents have recently "seen the rise of the 24-hour
celebrity"; and-like moths attracted to a light-the 24-hour paparazzi
have followed.2 Although paparazzi and tabloids have been around for
decades, many celebrities and local lawmakers have recently complained
that paparazzis' overly aggressive picture-taking tactics are threatening
"public safety and personal privacy.",3 "With the boom in Internet gossip
sites, tabloid television and a host of star-oriented magazines over the past
five years, the number of freelance photographers has risen [in Los
Angeles] from a few dozen to hundreds." 4  In fact, paparazzi pursue
celebrities to earn a potentially handsome reward,5 and also to freely enjoy
*J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2009; B.F.A., New York University, 1994. Member of
the State Bar of California. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance and perseverance
of the Entertainment Law Review editorial staff, especially Ryan Murray, Sharoni Finkelstein and
Jennifer Misetich.
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 196
(1890).
2. Posting of Joe M. to LA Criminal Defense Blog,
http://www.lacriminaldefenseblog.com/paparazzi-vs-celebrities-who-wins-the-camera-or-britney/
(Mar. 17, 2008).
3. City Hall Abuzz with Paparazzi Aggression Hearing, CBS2, July 31, 2008,
http://cbs2.com/local/Paparazzi.City.Hall.2.784571 .html [hereinafter City Hall Abuzz].
4. David Ferrell, Building a Britney Bubble: The Paparazzi No-Spy Zone, L.A. WKLY.,
Feb. 21, 2008, available at http://www.laweekly.com/2008-02-21/news/building-a-britney-
bubble/ (quoting the Times of London describing "Los Angeles' growing throngs of paparazzi").
5. See, e.g., Brian Dakss, Paparazzi Going Too Far?, CBSNEWS, June 10, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.con/stories/2005/06/10/earlyshow/leisure/celebspot/main700831 .shtml
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their First Amendment rights.6
Despite the overwhelming attention that Princess Diana's tragic
paparazzi-related fatal car accident garnered over ten years ago, 7 celebrities
and paparazzi continue to have dangerous encounters with each other-
especially in Los Angeles, the entertainment capital of the world. In one
highly publicized incident, a paparazzo crashed into actress Lindsay
Lohan's car while he attempted to obtain a money shot.8 Another
paparazzo pursued Angelina Jolie in a high-speed chase when the actress
went to a toy store with her children. 9 More recently, a violent clash
erupted on Malibu's Little Dume Beach between surfers and paparazzi
when celebrity photographers tried to take Matthew McConaughey's
picture while the actor was surfing. 10
Local lawmakers have suggested a wide range of possibilities to
curtail the paparazzi activity, such as "requiring all 'celebrity
photographers' to file for a permit, ... taxing revenues generated from the
photos," and, most controversially, creating floating "buffer zones" or
"personal safety zones" around celebrities. i
A year after Princess Diana's death, and then again in 2005,
California enacted civil privacy torts in an attempt to deter aggressive
paparazzi, but no criminal law is yet in place. 12 In February 2008, after
two highly publicized incidents involving paparazzi-magnet Britney
Spears, 13 Los Angeles City Councilmember Dennis Zine proposed a new
(noting that US Weekly paid nearly $500,000 for pictures of actors Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie);
see also New Law Hits Aggressive Paparazzi in the Pocketbook, TMZ, Dec. 30, 2005,
http://www.tmz.com/2005/12/30/new-law-hits-aggressive-paparazzi-in-the-pocketbook ("Shots
of Ben Affieck and Jennifer Garner with their new baby.., could be worth $500,000.").
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting states from passing any law that abridges "the
freedom of speech, or of the press").
7. See Mary Jordan, Paparazzi and Driver Found Negligent in Princess Diana's Death,
WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2008, at C1.
8. Lindsay Lohan's Paparazzi Crash, MONSTERS AND CRITICS, Nov. 9, 2006,
http://www.monstersandcritics.com/people/news/article_ 220017.php.
9. Helen Eckinger, Chasing Angelina, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 23, 2007, § 5 (Tempo), at 1.
10. City Hall Abuzz, supra note 3.
11. Posting of Jason Crow to Citizen Media Law Project Blog,
http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2008/paparazzi-need-better-manners-not-more-laws (July 11,
2008) [hereinafter Posting of Jason Crow].
12. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West 2006).
13. Councilman Zine was primarily upset because of two incidents involving Britney
Spears. First, during Britney's infamous ambulance trip in January 2008, paparazzi jeopardized
the celebrity's ability to enter the hospital. During a subsequent highly publicized hospital trip,
the county incurred $25,000 in costs for "motorcycle, helicopter and patrol car escorts." Britney
Spears Inspires a New Law: L.A. City Councilman Proposes 'Personal Safety Bubble' for
Celebrities, MSNBc, Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.msnbc.nisn.com/id/23134171 [hereinafter Britney
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city ordinance to create a "personal safety zone" between paparazzi and the
celebrities they photograph. 14 In May 2008, the City of Malibu followed
suit, approving a measure "to address creation of 'safety buffer zones' or
other ways to protect people from endangerment or harassment." 15 Then in
June 2009, Santa Monica City Councilman Richard Bloom announced his
plan "to create a buffer zone around nursery schools." 16
Councilman Zine explained why he introduced the aptly dubbed
"Britney Spears Law" in Los Angeles: "it's about the paparazzi violating
everybody else's rights, freedoms and privileges.... If we think back a
few years, Princess Diana was driving down the road, paparazzi
chasing.... A crash occurred, Princess Diana died. I don't want to see
that happen here in Los Angeles." 17 Malibu City Councilmember Jefferson
Wagner said that his city asked Kenneth Starr, Dean of Pepperdine
University School of Law, "to help draft a new ordinance that would
restrict the harassment" of Malibu residents. 18
At first glance, the cities' proposed anti-paparazzi regulations seem
like a rational solution to the aggressive tabloid photographers. 19
However, in April 2008, the Los Angeles City Police Commission called
the city's proposals "unfair, ambiguous and probably unenforceable. 2 °
Additionally, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officials told the
commission that there are "numerous laws already on the books [that]
enable officers to deal with unruly behavior by paparazzi.21 Former
Spears Inspires a New Law].
14. Motion from Dennis P. Zine, L.A. City Councilmember, 3d Dist., Feb. 1, 2008,
available at http://extratv.warnerbros.com/images/news/0201 papmotion.pdf.
15. Anne Soble, City May Explore 'Outside' Sources to Rein in Paparazzi, MALIBU
SURFSIDE NEWS, May 8, 2008, at 2.
16. Carla Hall, Paparazzi 'Buffer Zone' Eyed, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2009, at A3.
17. Britney Spears Inspires a New Law, supra note 13.
18. Ben Marcus & Laura Tate, Malibu to Address Paparazzi Brawl, MALIBU TIMES, June
25, 2008, http://www.malibutimes.com/articles/2008/06/25/news/newsl.prt.
19. Posting of Jason Crow, supra note 11.
20. New Paparazzi Rules Not Needed, L.A. Police Say, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2008, at B7.
21. Id. For instance, "laws that address the dangerous aspects of paparazzi frenzies, such as
reckless driving, must be consistently applied." Motion from Dennis P. Zine, supra note 14.
Additionally, a plaintiff can hold a journalist liable for the tort of "intrusion-into-private-matters"
by showing that the photographer intentionally intruded upon his solitude, seclusion or private
affairs by penetrating "some zone of physical or sensory privacy" that surrounds the plaintiff.
Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1212 (Cal. 2007) (citing Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955
P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998)). Under the intrusion tort, a plaintiff must prove that he had an
objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the invaded place, and the intrusion
was in a manner that would be "highly offensive to a reasonable person." Id. (citing Shulman,
955 P.2d at 490). California Civil Code section 1708.8 also allows a plaintiff to sue for
"constructive invasion of privacy" when a photographer uses "a visual or auditory enhancing
device" to capture a plaintiff "engaging in a personal or familial activity under circumstances in
2009]
136 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:133
LAPD Chief William Bratton told Fox 1 1 News that "[h]alf of this issue-
actually about 90 percent of the issue is that celebrities should keep their
clothes on.",22  Furthermore, other opponents argue that "celebrities
themselves want the best of both worlds, seeking out the cameras when
they want to bask in the limelight, and smashing those same cameras on the
ground when they find them annoying.", 23 Nevertheless, Internet blogs
such as Perez Hilton 24 and TMZ.com continue to fuel growing consumer
25demand for candid celebrity images. Therefore, Los Angeles area
lawmakers will find it challenging to tame the aggressive photographers
because the potential reward for capturing the most revealing photographs
outweighs the sting of most available deterrents.26 Furthermore, the First
Amendment of the Constitution creates a substantial roadblock for
lawmakers when they attempt to draft statutory language that complies
with Supreme Court precedent.
The First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the press' right to
speak and publish, and also protect the public's right to receive
information. 27 "The constitutional guarantee of a free press 'assures the
maintenance of our political system and an open society,' and secures 'the
paramount public interest in a free flow of information .... ,,,28 Moreover,
"freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First
Amendment." 
29
Approximately one decade ago, leading First Amendment scholar
Rodney A. Smolla argued that the First Amendment would compel courts
to strike down any law in which a legislature became "suddenly galvanized
which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b).
22. City Hall Abuzz, supra note 3 (quoting former LAPD Chief William Bratton).
23. Bill Analysis: Hearing on Assem. B. 524 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2009-
2010 Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 2009) [hereinafter BillAnalysis: Hearing on Assem. B. 524], available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_0501-
0550/ab_524_cfa_20090713_124145 sen comm.html.
24. "'Perez Hilton' ... operates the website perezhilton.com. The website is a blog that
provides a series of journal-like entries featuring celebrity gossip... and which allegedly
generates millions of users and-consequently-thousands of dollars in advertising revenue each
day.... The photographs [posted on the blog] are essentially paparazzi-type, candid shots that
depict celebrities engaged in their typical day-to-day activities-for example, Heather Locklear
leaving a lunch meeting, Nicole Richie grocery shopping, and Britney Spears exposing herself."
X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
25. Posting of Jason Crow, supra note 11.
26. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
27. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV (conferring restriction that a state "shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press"); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832-
33 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
28. Pell, 417 U.S. at 832 (internal citations omitted).
29. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
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into a mood of zealous pro-privacy protection, and ... were to enact a
[law] that made it illegal to take anyone's photograph in any public or
private place without that person's consent."30  On the other hand, some
legal scholars have suggested that paparazzi "align themselves with 'the
press' simply to "allege [that] their 'information gathering' is
constitutionally protected" by the First Amendment.31 Councilman Zine
even believes that paparazzi do not qualify as "legitimate media" because
they are not "credentialed." 3 2 Instead, he argues they are just people with
cameras. 33 Notably, while the LAPD authorizes press credentials to full-
time employees of news organizations, it does not provide credentials to
entertainment or sports reporters.34
The cities of Los Angeles, Malibu and Santa Monica have yet to
publicize the exact language of their anti-paparazzi ordinances. However,
for purposes of the analysis below, this article addresses the
constitutionality of five separate provisions that the cities are likely to
include in their legislation: (1) a subject matter provision, which will
regulate the photography of "public figures" who are engaging in personal
or familial activities; (2) a provision that imposes fines on photographers
who intend to sell or publish celebrity photographs; (3) a scienter
requirement; (4) a floating "buffer zone" provision; and (5) a provision that
provides immunity to photographers where celebrities have given their
express or implied consent. For instance, the Los Angeles ordinance may
read as follows:
(a)A person is guilty of a misdemeanor when he or she
knowingly enters an area within eight feet of a public figure 
35
30. Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1097, 1128 (1999) (arguing that strict scrutiny should be applied to anti-paparazzi
laws).
31. Patrick J. Alach, Comment, Paparazzi and Privacy, 28 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 205, 207
(2008).
32. Ferrell, supra note 4 (quoting Councilman Dennis Zine).
33. Id. (quoting Councilman Dennis Zine).
34. City Hall Abuzz, supra note 3.
35. Early reports publicized Los Angeles' initial proposal of a twenty yard personal safety
zone (sixty feet). E.g., James L. Hirsen, "Britney Law" Proposed in L.A., FIRSTLIBERTIES, Feb.
11, 2008, http://www.firstliberties.com/britneyjlaw.html; Lis Wiehl, Opinion, If Passed, "Britney
Law" May End Paparazzi Stalking Tactics, FOxNEWS, Mar. 6, 2008,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,335848,00.html; John Harlow, "Britney Law" to Give
Celebrities a Safety Bubble, TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 10, 2008,
http://entertainnent.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts-andentertainment/music/article3341791 .ece.
However, as discussed, infra, a sixty-foot distance will likely not pass constitutional muster. See
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 377-78 (1997) (striking down a fifteen-foot
personal safety zone). Therefore, this ordinance includes an eight-foot buffer zone, similar to the
zone of privacy upheld in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 729-30 (2000).
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with the intent to capture, in a manner that is highly offensive to
a reasonable person, 36 any type of visual image, sound
recording, or other physical impression of the public figure
when the public figure is engaging in a personal or familial
activity in the public way or sidewalk area within a radius of one
hundred feet from any entrance door to a health care facility,
courthouse or school. 3
(b)A person will not be guilty of a misdemeanor under
subdivision (a) if the public figure gives express or implied
consent.
(c)A person qualifies as a public figure under subdivisions (a)
and (b) if he or she qualifies as a public figure under the laws
governing defamation.38
(d)A person who qualifies as a public figure under subdivision
(c) and who also qualifies as a public official under the laws
governing defamation does not qualify as a public figure for the
purposes of subdivision (a).
(e)A finding of guilt under this section shall be punishable by a
fine of not more than $1,000.00. Additionally, if the City of Los
Angeles proves that the invasion of privacy was committed for a
commercial purpose, the defendant shall also be subject to
disgorgement to the City of any proceeds or other consideration
obtained as a result of violating this section. 39
(f)For the purposes of this section, "for a commercial purpose"
shall mean any act done with the expectation of a sale, financial
gain, or other consideration. A visual image, sound recording,
or other physical impression shall not be found to have been, or
intended to have been captured for a commercial purpose unless
it is intended to be, or was in fact, sold, published, or
36. The provision that requires the defendant's intent to capture a physical impression of the
public figure be in a manner that is "highly offensive to a reasonable person" is copied from the
Restatement, which lists this language as one element to the tort of "publicity given to private
life." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D(a) (1977). As discussed, infra, the "highly
offensive" provision is intended to mirror the Supreme Court's "actual malice" requirement for
defamation claims against "public figures." See full discussion infra Part III.C.
37. The "personal or familial activity" provision is copied from California's anti-paparazzi
tort. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b). The 100-foot radius provision around health care
facilities and courthouses is similar to COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999), the provision
upheld in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 707.
38. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (introducing the "public
figure" doctrine).
39. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(d) (providing the text of this disgorgement provision).
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transmitted.40
(g)For the purposes of this section, "personal or familial
activity" includes, but is not limited to, intimate details of the
public figure's personal life, interactions with the public figure's
family or significant others, or other aspects of the public
41figure's private affairs or concerns.
Notably, the hypothetical ordinance above includes no actual sale or
publication requirement as an element of guilt (although additional
damages arise out of a photographer's intent to sell or publish).
These anti-paparazzi proposals are likely to raise two separate, but
related, First Amendment issues. First, the ordinances may violate the
Amendment's freedom of press protections because important
newsgathering interests far outweigh the cities' privacy concerns.42 Here,
the Supreme Court's "public figure" doctrine-introduced in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.-will clearly be at issue. Second, the floating
"buffer-zone" provisions may violate the First Amendment's freedom of
speech protections.
II. PRIVACY LAW BACKGROUND
While the California Constitution expressly provides an inalienable
right of privacy to state residents, 4 the federal Constitution includes no
such explicit privacy right. Nevertheless, through the years, the Supreme
Court has interpreted fundamental constitutional privacy rights emanating
from the "penumbras" of other specifically defined rights, including those
of the First Amendment.45 For instance, in NAACP v. Alabama, the Court
held that the First Amendment protects "'privacy in one's associations.' 
46
Additionally, in Katz v. United States, the landmark Fourth
Amendment right to privacy decision, the Court recognized a
constitutionally protected, reasonable expectation of privacy in the context
40. See id. § 1708.8(k).
41. See id. § 1708.8(1).
42. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490-91, 496 (1975).
43. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
44. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
45. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance"); Alach, supra note 31, at 208; see also, e.g., U.S. CONST.
amends. I (protecting freedom of association), III (prohibiting quartering of soldiers without
homeowners consent), IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures), V (conferring
privilege against self-incrimination), IX (reserving other unenumerated rights).
46. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)).
20091
140 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:133
of government searches. 47 There, the Court famously held that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. 48  Therefore, the government
potentially violates a person's expectation of privacy even when a person is
in a public place, such as a phone booth.49 In his concurring opinion,
Justice Harlan enunciated the settled test for what constitutes a search,
triggering the Fourth Amendment's privacy protections. 50 First, a person
must "have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy"; and,
second, the expectation must "be one that society is prepared to recognize
as [objectively] 'reasonable."' 
51
Nevertheless, despite a long history of Fourth Amendment privacy
doctrines designed to protect against illegal searches (as delineated by Katz
and its progeny), First Amendment jurisprudence has generally protected
photographers from civil invasion of privacy claims in public, assuming the
photographer did not commit any independent crime or tort.52  Thus,
photographers are generally protected because, "[o]n the public street, or in
any other public place, [a] plaintiff has no right to be alone." 53 Indeed,
some courts have held that appearing in public "necessarily involves
doffing the cloak of privacy which the law protects." 54  Courts have
applied this principle to the famous-as well as the infamous-especially
where the subject matter depicted in a photograph is deemed a matter of
public concern.
Through the years, several academics have noted the complexity in
defining the essence and scope of the right to privacy. Some theorists
define privacy as a form of control over personal information.55 Other
theorists argue that "intimacy" is the common denominator in all privacy
matters.56 Yet another group of academics contend that privacy is a puzzle
of
47. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .....
48. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (majority opinion).
49. Id. at 351-52 (majority opinion).
50. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
51. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
52. See, e.g., Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Okla. County Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 308-09 (1977).
Of course the First Amendment does not license photographers "to trespass, to steal, or to intrude
by electronic means into the precincts of another's home or office." Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449
F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
53. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964).
54. Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
55. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968).
56. E.g., JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56, 58, 63, 64, 67 (Oxford
University Press 1992).
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three independent and irreducible elements: secrecy,
anonymity, and solitude. Each is independent in the sense that a
loss of privacy may occur through a change in any one of the
three, without a necessary loss in either of the other two. The
concept is nevertheless coherent because the three elements are
all part of the same notion of accessibility. .... "
The concept of privacy is "entangled in competing and contradictory
dimensions" and "engorged with various and distinct meanings." 58
Additionally, because federal constitutional privacy interests are so
diverse--especially in the comprehensive "penumbral" sense-the Court
has not provided one coherent legal definition or standard. 9
In general, the term "right to privacy" has broadly evolved into four
separate commonly known privacy torts, which the vast majority of
jurisdictions now recognize, including California.60  In 1960, Dean
William Prosser defined the analytical framework for these privacy torts,
and the Restatement of Torts has further expounded on Dean Prosser's
initial definitions. 6' Collectively, the following four torts are known as
"invasion of privacy": (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) public disclosure
of private facts; (3) false light; and (4) appropriation (of name or
likeness).62 The common denominator among them is a defendant's
improper interference with personal or confidential aspects of a plaintiffs
life, and the standards are based upon widely shared social norms.
63
Generally, "intrusion upon seclusion" and "public disclosure of private
facts" are the most applicable torts in the press context; however,
California also enacted a more restrictive newsgathering privacy tort
known as "constructive invasion of privacy." 64
In 2009, the California Supreme Court in Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc.
conflated its analysis of the common law intrusion tort with its test for
57. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 433-34 (1980).
58. Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001).
59. Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 651 (Cal. 1994).
60. Id. at 647; see also, e.g., Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 234-35
(Minn. 1998) (recognizing invasion of privacy formally in Minnesota, and noting that North
Dakota and Wyoming are the only states not to have adopted some form of civil invasion of
privacy remedy).
61. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652D (1977) (public disclosure of private facts), 652B (intrusion upon
seclusion), 652E (false light), 652C (appropriation).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652D (public disclosure of private facts), 652B
(intrusion upon seclusion), 652E (false light), 652C (appropriation).
63. Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d at 647.
64. See CAL. Ctv. CODE § 1708.8 (West 2006).
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establishing a privacy violation under the state's constitution. 65 Under the
parallel elements of the two tests, the court considers: "(1) the nature of
any intrusion upon reasonable expectations of privacy, and (2) the
offensiveness or seriousness of the intrusion, including any justification
and other relevant interests." 66 California law does not provide a bright
line rule to determine whether an alleged intrusion is offensive; "each case
must be taken on its facts."67 However, courts consider several factors,
including "the degree of the intrusion, the context, conduct and
circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder's motives
and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the expectations of
those whose privacy is invaded.", 68 The California high court based its
two-part privacy test on its lengthy and comprehensive privacy discussion
in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, where the court
discussed the history of privacy rights under California law as well as the
evolution of privacy rights under the federal Constitution.69
Since Samuel Warren and Justice Louis Brandeis first recognized the
right to be left alone over a century ago, states have struggled to balance
privacy interests without infringing on First Amendment rights. The
Supreme Court has addressed this conflict between First Amendment
jurisprudence and state privacy laws several times in recent years, but not
exhaustively. 71 On the contrary, although the Court's decisions "have
without exception upheld the press' right to publish," lower courts have
resolved other privacy-related conflicts only as they have arisen "in a
discrete factual context" by balancing an individual's right to be left alone
against fundamental First Amendment protections.72
For instance, in Galella v. Onassis, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld an injunction ordering a paparazzo to stay at least
twenty-five feet away from President Kennedy's widow because the
photographer stalked her, "insinuated himself into the very fabric of [her]
65. Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1072-73 (Cal. 2009).
66. Id. at 1074 (citing Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d at 649, 653-54).
67. Id. at 1073; Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469,494 (Cal. 1998).
68. Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d at 648 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
69. See id. at 641-67.
70. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 ("[T]he next step ... must be taken for the
protection of the person, and for securing to the individual... the right 'to be let alone."').
71. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989).
72. Id.; see also Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d at 651 ("In privacy cases
involving informational interests, the federal courts have generally applied balancing tests that
avoid rigid 'compelling interest' or 'strict scrutiny' formulations.").
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life," and went "beyond the reasonable bounds of newsgathering."
7 3
However, courts have overwhelmingly rejected invasion of privacy claims
where journalists conducted lawful newsgathering activities in public." 4
Indeed, the right of reporters and photographers to take photographs in
public has been a cornerstone of our democracy.
III. ANTI-PAPARAZZI ORDINANCES THAT IMPLICATE THE "PUBLIC
FIGURE" DOCTRINE VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT BECAUSE FREEDOM
OF PRESS PROTECTIONS OUTWEIGH PRIVACY CONCERNS
Unlike defamation law, which protects people from the publication of
false information,7 5 laws that regulate paparazzi restrict photographers'
ability to capture truthful information because a camera captures actual
events. Courts have noted that taking a picture "amounts to nothing more
than making a record, not differing essentially from a full written
description of a public sight which anyone present would be free to see."76
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court noted that when a law
"imposes sanctions on the publication of truthful information of public
concern," enforcement of such a provision "implicates the core purposes of
the First Amendment."0 7  Otherwise stated in the Restatement of Torts:
"When the subject-matter of ... publicity is of legitimate public concern,
there is no invasion of privacy." 78 This common law rule of torts has also
become a rule of the federal Constitution. 79 According to the Court, a
73. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994-95 (2d Cir. 1973).
74. See, e.g., Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that
the intrusion upon seclusion tort "does not apply to matters which occur in a public place or a
place otherwise open to the public eye"); Aisenson v. ABC, Inc., 269 Cal. Rptr. 379, 388 (Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that there was no invasion of privacy where camera crew videotaped
plaintiff in his driveway from a car parked across the street from plaintiffs home and plaintiff
was in full public view).
75. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 45, 46 (West 2008); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558
(1977) (listing as the first of four elements required to prevail on a defamation claim, "a false and
defamatory statement concerning another"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(A) cmt. A
(1977) (noting that "there can be no recovery in defamation for a statement of fact that is true");
see Smith v. Maldonado, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 402 (Ct. App. 1999) (noting that the defamation
tort "involves the intentional publication of a statement of fact that is false, unprivileged, and has
a natural tendency to injure or which causes special damage."); see also Washer v. Bank of Am.
Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 197 P.2d 202, 207-08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (noting that truth is a
complete defense against liability for defamation, regardless of bad faith or malicious purpose).
76. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964).
77. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533-34 (2001).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. D (1977); see also Virgil v. Time,
Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Liability may be imposed for an invasion of privacy
only if 'the matter publicized is of a kind which.., is not of legitimate concern to the public."').
79. Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 668 (Ct. App. 1984); accord Cox
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matter of public concern includes "any matter of sufficient general interest
[that] prompt[s] media coverage." 8
0
In Bartnicki, the Court held that an individual could not be held liable
under a federal law prohibiting intentional disclosure of contents from an
illegally intercepted communication where the individual lawfully received
the cellular phone conversation recording from an unknown third party, and
the conversation concerned a matter of public concern. 81 There, the First
Amendment interest in publishing matters of public importance outweighed
the plaintiffs' privacy rights. 82 Additionally, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, the Court held that the First Amendment precludes recovery for
disclosure of, and publicity to, facts that are a matter of public record. 83
However, there the Court explicitly left open the question of whether the
Constitution permits liability for dissemination of other truthful facts about
"very private matters unrelated to public affairs" that would be "offensive
to the sensibilities of the supposed reasonable man." 
84
Importantly, in both Bartnicki and Cox Broadcasting, the Court
balanced competing press and privacy concerns in cases where defendants
actually published or disseminated information,85 whereas Los Angeles
area lawmakers are hoping to punish newsgatherers rather than
publishers. 86 Courts have routinely noted that "at some point, the public
interest in obtaining information becomes dominant over the individual's
desire for privacy." 87 Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly
held that the First Amendment absolutely protects newsgathering,88 in
Branzburg v. Hayes, its leading case on the press clause, the Court noted
that "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the
press could be eviscerated." 
89
Leading constitutional law scholar and Dean of UC Irvine School of
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1975).
80. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 357 n.6 (1974); see also Martin v. Comm.
for Honesty and Justice at Star Valley Ranch, 101 P.3d 123, 128 (Wyo. 2004) (noting that "a
public controversy is a dispute that... has received public attention because its ramifications will
be felt by persons who are not direct participants").
81. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517-18.
82. Id. at 534.
83. Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 496.
84. Id. at 490-91,496.
85. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528-29; Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 491.
86. See Motion from Dennis P. Zine, supra note 14; Marcus & Tate, supra note 18, at 1.
87. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
88. Erik Ugland, Demarcating the Right to Gather News: A Sequential Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 113, 121 (2008) (emphasizing the lack of a
conclusive ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court as newsgathering rights vary across jurisdictions).
89. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
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Law Erwin Chemerinsky acknowledges that the Court has "failed to
provide any First Amendment protection for newsgathering," but
nevertheless, argues that newsgathering should be subject to intermediate
scrutiny. 90 If the Constitution does in fact protect newsgatherers, courts
have noted that such protection "is far narrower than the protection
surrounding the publication of truthful material." 9' Consequently, "the fact
that a reporter may be seeking 'newsworthy' material does not in itself
privilege the investigatory activity."' 92 However, news publishers would
find it virtually impossible to disseminate the news without the ability to
freely and lawfully gather truthful information. It is well settled that "laws
that single out the press, or certain elements thereof, for special treatment
pose a particular danger of abuse by the State, and so are always subject to
at least some degree of heightened First Amendment scrutiny." 93  For
instance, in 1983, the Supreme Court struck down a tax on newsprint and
ink that had a disproportionate impact on newspapers, holding that laws
that discriminate against the press, or against other forms of expressive
activity, are presumptively unconstitutional. 94
The primary constitutional issue raised by anti-paparazzi proposals in
Los Angeles, Malibu, and Santa Monica is whether the First Amendment
precludes an imposition of guilt where a photographer merely captures an
image of a "public figure" in a public place, without going beyond the
reasonable bounds of newsgathering. 95  As the California legislature
declared,
[t]he right to privacy and respect for private lives of individuals
and their families must be balanced against the right of the
media to gather and report the news. The right of a free press to
report details of an individual's private life must be weighed
against the rights of the individual to enjoy liberty and
privacy. 96
90. Erwin Chemerinsky, Protect the Press: A First Amendment Standard for Safeguarding
Aggressive Newsgathering, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 1143, 1145, 1161-62 (2000).
91. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469,496 (Cal. 1998).
92. Id.
93. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1994) (quoting Ark. Writers'
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987)) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
94. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585, 591
(1983).
95. It is important to note that Los Angeles, Malibu and Santa Monica ordinances will be
sufficient "state actions" to trigger First Amendment protections. See Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991).
96. Assem. B. 524, § 1(e), 2009-10 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009), available at
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In Dietemann v. Time, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
made the seemingly obvious observation that "newsgathering is an integral
part of news dissemination." 97  In order to provide constitutionally
protected news, journalists, including paparazzi, must be able to lawfully
gather information in public without fear of liability.
Furthermore, First Amendment protections outweigh privacy
concerns in the proposed city ordinances for the following reasons: (1)
photographs taken in public places are protected assuming the pictures do
not shock the ordinary sense of decency; (2) tabloid journalism qualifies as
"news," whether or not tabloid-like photographs are tied to publication or
sale; (3) anti-paparazzi laws that implicate the "public figure" doctrine
violate the First Amendment because photographs of public figures, which
convey factual information, may be deemed "newsworthy"; and (4) in Los
Angeles, Malibu and Santa Monica, photographs of celebrities engaging in
private activities qualify as "newsworthy" because the customs and
conventions of those communities dictate that stories about celebrities'
personal lives may be of legitimate public concern.
A. Photographs Taken in Public Places Are Protected Assuming the
Pictures Do Not Shock the Ordinary Sense of Decency
Under well-established constitutional law, a photographer who takes a
celebrity's picture in public cannot be held liable for invasion of privacy
where the picture conveys facts of public concern. 98 This is because a
public figure has a much lower expectation of privacy when he or she is in
a public place--especially in a celebrity-enclave such as Los Angeles. In
the language of Katz v. United States, even if a celebrity has "an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy" on a Los Angeles public sidewalk,
society is not prepared to recognize such an expectation as reasonable. 99
Clearly, in Los Angeles, any such privacy expectation would be manifestly
unreasonable. Indeed, it is well-known that "in addition to being the media
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09- 1 0/bill/asm/ab_0501-
0550/ab_524_bill_20090916_enrolled.html.
97. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
98. See Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1953) (finding that a photograph
of plaintiff embracing his wife in a public market place "portray[ed] nothing to shock the ordinary
sense of decency"); cf Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490-91 (Cal. 1998)
(holding that defendant may have had a reasonable expectation of privacy once she was placed in
a medical helicopter, and was entitled to a degree of privacy in conversations with medical
rescuers).
99. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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capital of the world, Los Angeles is also a center for paparazzi." 100 Many
Hollywood publicists call ahead, alerting paparazzi to their clients'
whereabouts to generate additional publicity. 101 Therefore, these
celebrities should not be surprised when paparazzi show up to take their
pictures.
Under California privacy law, a plaintiffs reasonable expectation of
privacy is based on several objective factors, including "an examination of
customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding particular activities,
as well as the opportunity to be notified in advance and consent to the
intrusion." 102 Courts have regularly distinguished between the reasonable
privacy expectation a person has in a secluded home or office, and the
unreasonable privacy expectation a person has in a place that is "regularly
open to entry or observation by the public or press," or where a person can
be "overheard or observed by others." 103 Additionally, when a public
figure reveals personal facts to a casual observer, that public figure cannot
later argue that the photographer "intruded into his private sphere." 104
However, the Supreme Court has noted that merely because facts are
in the public view does not mean they should be subject to mass public
disclosure. '05 Indeed, the concepts of privacy and seclusion are relative. 106
"The mere fact that a person can be seen by someone does not
automatically mean that he or she can legally be forced to be subject to
being seen by everyone." 107 Moreover, several state courts have held that
"[a] person does not automatically make public everything he does merely
by being in a public place." 108 At least in the context of "private figures,"
"there may be some matters about [a person], such as his underwear or lack
of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and there may still be
100. See Motion from Dennis P. Zine, supra note 14.
101. Liz Kelly, Meetthefamous.com-Inspired or Invasion of Privacy?, WASH. POST, Mar.
31, 2009,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/celebritology/2009/03/meet-the famousand_make_a_few.ht
ml.
102. Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1072-73 (Cal. 2009) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
103. Id. at 1074-75 (quoting Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 978 P.2d 67, 77 (Cal. 1999)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
104. Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970).
105. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S.
749, 770 (1989) (noting "the fact that an event is not wholly 'private' does not mean that an
individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the information").
106. See Sanders, 978 P.2d at 72 ("There are degrees and nuances to societal recognition of
our expectations of privacy.").
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. E.g., Nader, 255 N.E.2d at 771.
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invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters." 109
For instance, in Daily Times Democrat v. Graham,. a private figure's
panties were exposed when her dress was blown up by air jets (A la Marilyn
Monroe) as she exited a "Fun House" at a county fair with her two sons. 110
At that moment, a newspaper photographer snapped her picture, and his
employer published the embarrassing photograph on the front page of a
local newspaper in connection with a write-up of the fair. "' The
newspaper argued that the photograph was an integral part of a legitimate
news story. 112 Nevertheless, the Alabama high court disagreed and upheld
the jury's award of damages for invasion of privacy. 113 The court found
the photograph to be "embarrassing to one of normal sensibilities" and,
moreover, believed that the photograph "could properly be classified as
obscene." 114
In Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., the California Supreme Court used a
similar standard as the Graham court discussed above, but arrived at a
different conclusion. 115 In Gill, a magazine published and distributed an
allegedly unauthorized photograph of the plaintiffs while they "were seated
in an affectionate pose at their place of business, a confectionery and ice
cream concession in the Farmers' Market in Los Angeles." 116 The court
considered the nature of the picture in question and found it "significant
that [the photograph] was not surreptitiously snapped on private grounds,
but rather was taken of plaintiffs in a pose voluntarily assumed in a public
market place." 117 In short, the Gill court found that "the photograph did
not disclose anything which until then had been private, but rather only
extended knowledge of the particular incident to a somewhat larger public
[than] had actually witnessed it at the time of occurrence." 118 Additionally,
unlike in Graham, the Gill court held that the photograph of the plaintiffs
taken while they were romantically embracing portrayed "nothing to shock
the ordinary sense of decency." 119 To hold otherwise, the court noted,
would mean that plaintiffs under all conceivable circumstances
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977).
110. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 476 (Ala. 1964).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 477.
113. Id. at 478.
114. Id. at 477. The First Amendment does not protect obscene expression. See generally
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
115. See Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444-45 (Cal. 1953).
116. Id. at 442.
117. Id. at 444.
118. Id. at 445.
119. Id.
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had an absolute legal right to prevent publication of any
photograph of them taken without their permission. If every
person has such a right, no periodical could lawfully publish a
photograph of a parade or a street scene. 120
In fact, where photographers take pictures in public places, courts
generally hold that unless the photograph is "offensive in the light of
'ordinary sensibilities,"' there can be no liability for invasion of privacy. 121
As shown in the hypothetical ordinance above, Los Angeles and other
surrounding cities should impose liability for privacy invasions into
personal or familial activities only when the manner of newsgathering is
"highly offensive to a reasonable person"; otherwise, the ordinances will
likely violate the First Amendment. 122
B. Tabloid Journalism Qualifies as "News"
Courts have never compelled journalists to "obtain the government's
imprimatur in order to practice their trade." 123 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has strenuously resisted attempts to legally define what it means to be a
"bona fide" or "professional" journalist. 124 Therefore, virtually anyone
who seeks out the news potentially qualifies as a "newsman"-including a
celebrity photographer. 125 Furthermore, the Court held that "[f]reedom of
120. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
121. Gill, 253 P.2d at 444 (quoting 41 AM. JUR. 2d Privacy § 12 (1964)). Some courts have
gone further by stating that a "factually accurate public disclosure" is not an invasion of privacy
"when connected with a newsworthy event even though offensive to ordinary sensibilities." Neff
v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp 858, 861 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D(a) (1977).
123. Jane E. Kirtley, Privacy and the News Media: A Question of Trust or of Control?,
21ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVACY AND PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 6 (1999),
available at http://www.pcpd.org.hk/english/infocentre/files/kirtley-paper.doc.
124. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703-04 (1972), the leading case on the press
clause, the Supreme Court noted the difficult and vexing nature of defining the privileges of
"newsmen." Indeed, the Constitution protects all citizens, and there is no reason to believe that
the Branzburg Court intended to elevate the journalistic class above the rest. In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 978-79 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1150
(2005).
125. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 773 (1985)
(plurality opinion) (White, J., concurring) ("Wisely,... Justice POWELL does not rest his
application.. . on a distinction drawn between media and nonmedia defendants. On that issue, I
agree with Justice BRENNAN that the First Amendment gives no more protection to the press in
defamation suits than it does to others exercising their freedom of speech. None of our cases
affords such a distinction; to the contrary, the Court has rejected it at every turn."); cf Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 n.6 (1990) ("In Hepps the Court reserved judgment on cases
involving nonmedia defendants, .... and accordingly we do the same." (discussing Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 779 (1986))).
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the press is a 'fundamental personal right' which 'is not confined to
newspapers and periodicals .... The press in its historic connotation
comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of
information and opinion.'126 The Court also recognized "that
entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment protection," and
correctly observed "that entertainment itself can be important news." 127
However, the dividing line between information and entertainment has
become too elusive for the Court to define. 128 Even the word
"'[p]aparazzi' is a bit of a misnomer now," as the CEO of one Internet
gossip blog correctly observed. 129 "Originally, paparazzi [were] a select
group specializing in a specific kind of celebrity shooting. Now AP,
Reuters--everybody's doing it." 130 Therefore, the First Amendment does
not compel the courts to distinguish between celebrity photographs
published in a newspaper or magazine and those posted on Internet blogs.
Moreover, any court that chooses to analyze whether photographs
posted on the Internet qualify as "news" must consider the fact that, as of
2008, the Internet "surpassed all other media except television as an outlet
for national and international news." 131 Indeed, forty percent of Americans
"say they rely mostly on the Internet for news," whereas only thirty-five
percent now rely on newspapers. 132 California courts have also
acknowledged that websites and other digital publications are now widely
recognized as "magazines." 1 33  Therefore, Internet blogs such as Perez
126. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704 (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,452 (1938)).
127. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (citing Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967)).
128. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. at 388.
129. Peter Gilstrap, Paparazzi Business Being Redefined: Biz About Volume, Feeding Ever-
Expanding Market, VARIETY, July 6, 2007, at 4, 42.
130. Id. Other upstart players "in the photo game are the MOPS, industry jargon for
Members of the Public. With cheap, user-friendly digital units and cell phone cameras, a money-
making snap can potentially be captured by almost anyone." Id.
131. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, INTERNET OVERTAKES NEWSPAPERS AS NEWS OUTLET
(2008), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1066/internet-overtakes-newspapers-as-news-source.
132. Id.
133. O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 99-100 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 2, subdiv. (b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(a) (2009) (reporter's shield-law
privilege)) (discussing the ambiguity of the phrase "newspaper, magazine, or other periodical
publication" in the California Constitution). The state of Delaware defines "reporter" more
specifically than any other state. In Delaware, a reporter "means any journalist, scholar, educator,
polemicist, or other individual who either: (a) At the time he or she obtained the information that
is sought was earning his or her principal livelihood by, or in each of the preceding 3 weeks or 4
of the preceding 8 weeks had spent at least 20 hours engaged in the practice of, obtaining or
preparing information for dissemination with the aid of facilities for the mass reproduction of
words, sounds, or images in a form available to the general public; or (b) Obtained the
information that is sought while serving in the capacity of an agent, assistant, employee, or
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Hilton and TMZ.com qualify as news websites, and photographs taken for
eventual posting on such Internet news websites may qualify as
"newsworthy." 134
Of course not all amateur newsgatherers are looking to spread gossip
on the Internet or in other tabloids, nor does every person who captures a
newsworthy image or video necessarily seek payment. 135 However, the
proposed ordinances likely will be laws of general applicability because
they will apply equally to all people. Paparazzi, tourists, and investigative
reporters will all be guilty of misdemeanors if they violate the proposed
ordinances. The Supreme Court held in no uncertain terms that "generally
applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their
enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather
and report the news." 136 However, proposed ordinances in the Los
Angeles area will disproportionately target newsgathering, which will
render the laws unconstitutional. 137
Everyday citizens have been taking pictures of notable newsworthy
events for decades in public without fear of liability. Indeed, "[t]he rise of
the 'citizen journalist' is not a new phenomenon." 138 Amateur
photographers have been responsible for capturing some of the most
important newsworthy moments in history. For instance, Abraham
Zapruder famously filmed President John F. Kennedy's assassination with
his home movie camera and eventually sold the film to Life magazine for
$150,000 (about $500,000 in today's dollars). 139 Additionally, during the
Warren Commission's investigation of the Kennedy assassination, the
Commission "made extensive use of the Zapruder film, and placed great
reliance on it, as evidence in [its] Report." 140
Today, free-access websites such as YouTube 141 are popular
destinations for all kinds of videos, including important news clips. 142 For
supervisor of an individual who qualifies as a reporter under subparagraph a." DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10 § 4320 (2002).
134. See full discussion infra Part III.C-D.
135. See generally Dan Gillmor, The Decline (and Maybe Demise) of the Professional
Photojournalist, CENTER FOR CITIZEN MEDIA, Dec. 4, 2006,
http://citmedia.org/blog/2006/12/04/the-demise-of-the-professional-photojournalist/.
136. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
137. See id.; see also Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 704 (1986) (noting that
some laws, "although directed at activity with no expressive component, impose a
disproportionate burden upon those engaged in protected First Amendment activities").
138. Gillmor, supra note 135.
139. Id.; Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 133-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
140. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. at 134.
141. YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
142. Gillmor, supra note 135.
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instance, one "citizen journalist" recently captured shocking images of a
security guard abusing a student with a taser at the University of California,
Los Angeles, and another amateur videographer captured the now-famous
racist rantings of celebrity Michael Richards (Seinfeld's "Kramer") on his
mobile phone camera. 143 By restricting the activities of paparazzi, the
proposed city ordinances may disproportionately target this type of
important "citizen journalism," which should render the laws
unconstitutional.
At this point, it is unclear whether sale or publication provisions will
be included in the cities' anti-paparazzi ordinances. Defamation law and
existing privacy law already provide several adequate remedies to potential
civil plaintiffs seeking to redress their publication-related injuries.
Therefore, Los Angeles, Malibu and Santa Monica probably will not
include sale or publication requirements in their ordinances so that they are
able to directly target the aggressive paparazzi behavior with criminal
sanctions.
C. Photographs of "Public Figures "May Be Deemed "Newsworthy"
First Amendment protections generally outweigh privacy concerns
where a person "has achieved, or has had thrust upon him... [the] status of
a 'public figure."' 144 Under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, the
"public figure" category is quite broad. 145 As the Court explained in the
leading case, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., those categorized as "all-purpose
public figures" ''occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence
that they are deemed public figures for all purposes." 146 Conversely,
"limited-purpose public figures" are those who "have thrust themselves to
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved." 147 Courts also classify many types of
celebrity performers as public figures, including television and movie
actors, recording artists, and professional athletes. 148
Although such persons have not necessarily taken an active part
in debates on public issues, they remain, nevertheless, persons in
whom the public has continuing interest.... The essential
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
145. See James v. Gannett Co., 353 N.E.2d 834, 839 (N.Y. 1976) (reviewing the Court's
"public figure" case law).
146. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
147. Id.
148. James, 353 N.E.2d at 839.
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element underlying the category of public figures is that the
publicized person has taken an affirmative step to attract public
attention. 149
In order to determine whether an individual qualifies as a "public
figure"--as a matter of law-a court must look at the "nature and extent of
an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the
[claim]." 150 Courts also "look for evidence of affirmative actions by which
purported 'public figures' have thrust themselves into the forefront of
particular public controversies" and consider "the totality of the
circumstances." 151
In Gertz, the Supreme Court extended the New York Times v. Sullivan
malice standard-originally applied to "public officials" in defamation
claims-to "public figures," while choosing not to extend the same rule to
"private figures." 152 Therefore, liability for the publication of material
concerning "public figures" requires proof of falsity and a showing of
actual malice, while those accused of defaming "private figures" are
subject to a lower negligence standard. 153
The Gertz Court explained why public figures are less protected than
private figures under the First Amendment 154. Public figures are less
vulnerable to injury from defamatory statements because of their unique
ability to use "self-help" to correct any error and minimize a mistake's
adverse impact on their reputation. 155 Public figures usually enjoy
significantly greater access to communication channels than private
149. Id. at 839-40 (emphasis added). "Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to
become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly
involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
150. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352; see also Khawar v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 965 P.2d 696, 701 (Cal.
1998) ("[W]hether a plaintiff in a defamation action is a public figure is a question of law for the
trial court.").
151. Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Sup. Ct., 690 P.2d 610, 616 (Cal. 1984). One court
enunciated a three part test for determining public figure status. See Waldbaum v. Fairchild
Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296-98 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980). To
apply the Waldbaum standard, courts must: (1) determine whether the subject is part of a public
controversy; (2) determine whether the subject has thrust himself to the forefront of the particular
controversy; and (3) determine whether the claimed privacy violation was "germane to the
plaintiff's participation in the controversy." Id.
152. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-43, 353; see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964) (holding that a public official who sues in a defamation claim must prove that the
statement was made with "'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not").
153. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-47, 353.
154. See id. at 344-45 (holding that "private figures" only need to prove negligence in a
defamation action, whereas "public figures" need to prove malice).
155. Id. at 344.
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individuals, which enables them to counter criticism. 156 Additionally,
unlike private figures, public figures have "voluntarily exposed themselves
to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood[s]." 157 Under the
"actual malice" standard, a plaintiff must prove the defendant acted with
knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. 158
In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, the Supreme Court likewise extended
the New York Times standard to public figures who file state law claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress when media outlets publish
advertisement parodies or caricatures that include false statements. 159
There, the Court highlighted the rationale for extending the "actual malice"
standard to public figures: such a rule "is necessary to give adequate
'breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment." 160
In fact, the entire public figure doctrine grew out of the same basic
underlying assumption: First Amendment speech protections extend even
to some false speech. 161 Therefore, anti-paparazzi laws that implicate the
public figure doctrine and specifically target truthful information clearly
have a higher First Amendment mountain to climb.
In the seminal privacy case Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit correctly observed "the misfortunes and
frailties of. . . 'public figures' are subjects of considerable interest and
discussion to the rest of the population." 162 Furthermore, in Bartnicki, the
Supreme Court noted that "[o]ne of the costs associated with participation
in public affairs is an attendant loss of privacy." 163 Celebrities habitually
use their carefully cultivated personas to promote not just themselves, but
also personal causes ranging from AIDS research and animal rights to
religious freedom overseas. Therefore, it is utter nonsense for these
celebrities to argue that their lives are not of public concern. Courts have
noted that once an individual "has sought publicity he cannot at his whim
withdraw the events of his life from public scrutiny." 164 Additionally,
Sidis stands for the proposition that once an individual qualifies as a public
figure, that person may forever qualify as a public figure. 165 Nevertheless,
156. Id.
157. Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
158. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280.
159. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1988).
160. Id. at 56.
161. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
162. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809.
163. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001).
164. Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(internal citations omitted).
165. See Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809 (holding that a public figure who "cloaked himself in
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many of the same public figures who use their status to advance their
political causes are the same celebrities who testified before Congress in
1998, asking it to impose fines and prison terms on photographers who
harassed them in an attempt to take their pictures. 166
Several public figures-most famously Arnold Schwarzenegger, Clint
Eastwood, and the late Ronald Reagan and Sonny Bono-were elected to
public office largely on the strength of their Hollywood images and,
thereafter, carried dual roles as public figures and public officials. In
California, courts have held that the First Amendment protects news
coverage of both public officials and public figures "so long as the
interference is no greater than that necessary to protect the overriding
public interest." 167 Governor Schwarzenegger himself has been a
champion for anti-paparazzi laws, originally signing California's now-
famous "constructive invasion of privacy" tort in 1998, 168 as well as the
amended, harsher version of the same tort in 2009. 169 It is for this reason
the proposed ordinance above includes an exemption from liability for
photographing a public official who also qualifies as a public figure. 170
obscurity" may still be "a matter of public concern" and possess "considerable popular news
interest"); see also Brewer v. Memphis Publ'g Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1257 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
that an entertainer who has retreated out of the public eye for several years is still required to
prove malice in a defamation claim); Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 381 (4th Cir. 1971)
(noting that the "mere passage of time will not necessarily insulate from the application of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan").
166. Kelvin Childs, Actors Testify For Bills To Punish Paparazzi, EDITOR & PUBLISHER,
June 6, 1998, at 14 (detailing the actors who discussed the miserable existence celebrities lead as
objects of public fascination, and who are relentlessly hounded by the press); see generally
Protection from Personal Intrusion Act and Privacy Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R.
2448 and H.R. 3224 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998).
167. Aisenson v. ABC, Inc., 269 Cal. Rptr. 379, 388 (Ct. App. 1990).
168. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b)-(d) (West 2006) ("(b) A person is liable for constructive
invasion of privacy when the defendant attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a
reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the
plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity under circumstances in which the plaintiff had
a reasonable expectation of privacy, through the use of a visual or auditory enhancing device,
regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this image, sound recording, or other physical
impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the visual or auditory
enhancing device was used."). Notably, paparazzi also targeted the Governor and were later
convicted of misdemeanor false imprisonment after they chased him and his wife, Maria Shriver,
following his elective heart surgery and subsequent hospital release. See Robert W. Welkos,
Paparazzi Guilty in Schwarzenegger Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1998, at BI.
169. Schwarzenegger Signs Tougher Paparazzi Law, MSNBC, Oct. 12, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33283165/ns/entertainment-celebrities/; see Assem. B. 524, §
1(e), 2009-10 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-
10/bill/asm/ab_0501-0550/ab_524_bill_20090916enrolled.html.
170. After Gertz, public officials and public figures are treated substantially the same under
defamation law. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-47.
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Without this "public official" exemption, Governor Schwarzenegger would
be unconstitutionally shielded from the press because, as a former
Hollywood actor, he too qualifies as a "public figure." 171
In Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that "[t]oday's 'tabloid' style
investigative television reportage ... is entitled to all the safeguards with
which the Supreme Court has surrounded liability for defamation." 
172
Furthermore, other courts have held that the First Amendment protects
joumalists' public access to those persons who have thrust themselves into
the limelight when the community deems such public figures as
"newsworthy." 173 The Ninth Circuit and California state courts adopted
the Restatement approach to determine "newsworthiness," holding that
courts must look to the "customs and conventions of the community" in
order to determine if a subject is newsworthy under privacy law: 174
[T]he cases and authorities emphasize that the privilege to
publicize newsworthy matters incorporated in [the Restatement]
is... one of constitutional dimension based upon the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.... When the
subject-matter of the publicity is of legitimate public concern,
there is no invasion of privacy. This has now become a rule not
just of common law of torts, but of the Federal Constitution as
well. "'
The Restatement test for newsworthiness, developed by the Ninth Circuit in
Virgil v. Time, Inc., is the majority approach. 176
In two recent California Supreme Court cases, Shulman v. Group W
Productions, Inc. and Taus v. Loftus, the court discussed at great length the
"newsworthiness" element as a defense to liability for invasion of
privacy. 177 However, unlike cases involving "public figures," both of these
171. See James, 353 N.E.2d at 839-40 (noting that actors qualify as "public figures").
172. Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995).
173. S~e Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. e (1977)); accord Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g
Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 668 (Ct. App. 1984).
174. Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1129 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h);
accord Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
175. Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 668 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis
added); accord Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1975).
176. Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1129 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D); Geoff
Dendy, The Newsworthiness Defense to the Public Disclosure Tort, 85 KY. L.J. 147, 160-61
(1997). Additionally, "the majority ofjurisdictions consider newsworthiness a question of fact to
be decided by the jury." Id. (citing Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 773 (Ct.
App. 1983)).
177. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478-79 (Cal. 1998) (concluding
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cases involved "private figure" plaintiffs who were involuntarily thrust into
matters of public concern. 178 According to Shulman and Taus, in order to
invoke "newsworthiness" as a defense under California law: (1) the
content at issue must "have 'some substantial relevance to a matter of
legitimate public interest,"' and (2) there must be "a logical nexus"
between "[t]he contents of the publication or broadcast" and the matter of
public interest. 179 Therefore, courts must assess "the logical relationship or
nexus, or the lack thereof, between the events or activities that brought the
person into the public eye and the particular facts disclosed." 180 In other
words, "the more prominent a figure, the more likely the court will find
newsworthiness." 181
One legal scholar argues that the Supreme Court could incorporate
this test into its analysis of anti-paparazzi laws (if the laws are challenged
in court), and may do so without running afoul of the First Amendment. 182
Furthermore, the commentator argues that California's progressive
"newsworthiness" test is consistent with the current European model of
privacy rights, in which the focus is not on physical zones of privacy, but
rather, is tied to the subject matter of the activities taking place in the
photographs. 183 Mr. Alach cites two recent cases from the European
Union, both involving well-known international public figures-Princess
Caroline of Monaco and model/actress Naomi Campbell. 184 Both invasion
of privacy cases involved photographs of public figures engaged in private
activities while in public places, and both courts looked at the nature of the
activity in the photographs rather than the location where the pictures were
taken to determine whether the activity stimulated a debate of general
interest. 185
Princess Caroline prevailed on her privacy claim because the
"that the analysis of newsworthiness inevitably involves accommodating conflicting interests in
personal privacy and in press freedom as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution") and Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1208-09 (Cal. 2007) (reviewing the court's
"newsworthiness" discussion in Shulman). The Shulman court affirmed that "the dissemination
of truthful, newsworthy material is not actionable as a publication of private facts." Shulman, 955
P.2d at 479.
178. Taus, 151 P.3d at 1208; Shulman, 955 P.2d at 478.
179. Taus, 151 P.3d at 1208 (internal citations omitted).
180. Id.
181. Alach, supra note 31, at 227.
182. See id. at 225-27.
183. Id. at 228.
184. See id. at 220-25 (citing Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41;
Campbell v. MGN Ltd. [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.)).
185. See id. (citing Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 61; Campbell, [2004] 2 A.C.
20091
158 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:133
photographs depicted "scenes from her daily life, thus involving activities
of a purely private nature." 186 The court held that the sole purpose of the
publication of the photographs showing Princess Caroline horseback riding,
playing tennis, shopping, and riding a bicycle "was to satisfy the curiosity
of a particular readership regarding the details of [Princess Caroline's]
private life," and therefore failed "to contribute to any debate of general
interest to society," despite that the Princess was well-known to the
public. 187
Similarly, international supermodel and actress Naomi Campbell was
photographed leaving a Narcotics Anonymous meeting, and she sued the
newspaper that published the photographs in Europe. 188 The court held
that the newspaper unjustifiably infringed on Miss Campbell's right to
privacy and breached a duty of confidence because the newspaper knew, or
should have known, that the information would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 189
Nevertheless, what clearly distinguishes these European Union cases
from the paparazzi-related conflicts in the Los Angeles area is that both
European plaintiffs sued the publisher, whereas Councilman Zine proposes
to directly target the paparazzi for simply gathering the news. 190
Furthermore, both European plaintiffs were in Europe when their pictures
were taken; therefore, they may have had a higher expectation of privacy
than they reasonably could have expected on a Los Angeles public
sidewalk. 191 Moreover, as Mr. Alach correctly notes, European law states
that "privacy rights and freedom of expression 'are of equal value,"'
whereas American law "subordinates privacy rights to the First
Amendment." 192 Therefore, these European cases are inapposite because,
in the United States, the First Amendment protects the press more than the
right to privacy protects "public figures." 193 In fact, the Supreme Court
stressed that because American society "places a primary value on freedom
of speech and of press," the risk of exposure to others "is an essential
incident of life." 194
Arguably, celebrities in the Los Angeles area should expect their
186. Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 69.
187. Id. at 70.
188. Campbell, [200412 A.C. at 460-61.
189. Id. at 480, 492-93.
190. See Motion from Dennis P. Zine, supra note 14.
191. Alach, supra note 31, at 223-24.
192. Id. at 220 (quoting Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 61).
193. Id. at 224.
194. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
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pictures to be taken while they are in public. "9 In fact, many of these
celebrities owe much of their success to the publicity that their personal
lives generate in the press. 196 Therefore, the proposed ordinance above
includes requirements that (1) the photographer "knowingly enters" the
area within eight feet of a public figure, (2) the photographer must have
"the intent to capture any type of... physical impression of a public figure
when he or she is engaging in a personal or familial activity," and (3) the
physical invasion must occur in a manner that is "highly offensive to a
reasonable person." 197 By including these additional provisions, a court
may find that the cities successfully emulated the "actual malice"
requirements set forth in New York Times and Gertz, and therefore, the
ordinances may survive constitutional scrutiny under the "public figure"
doctrine. 198 However, as discussed below, other First Amendment
considerations will likely render the ordinances unconstitutionally invalid.
D. Customs and Conventions in Los Angeles Dictate that Stories About
Celebrities' Personal Lives May Be of Legitimate Public Concern
Under established privacy laws, the "customs and conventions of the
community" dictate that celebrity photographs taken in public places may
qualify as newsworthy, even if the public figure is engaged in personal or
familial activities. 199 Importantly, the Restatement notes that "the home
life and daily habits of a motion picture actress may be of legitimate and
reasonable interest to the public that sees her on the screen." 200
Gossip is no longer limited to publications like the National Enquirer
and Star Magazine. In fact, tabloid stories about celebrities often headline
the evening news in Los Angeles, replete with video-clips and photographs.
Additionally, the public's appetite for celebrity gossip is insatiable. "[T]he
problem is not the paparazzi, but rather the public's appetite to learn about
even the most mundane details of the celebrities' lives." 201 Even enquiring
195. See Ellen Feig, Paparazzi: Photographers Who Stalk Celebrities, ASSOCIATED
CONTENT, Apr. 9, 2006,
http://www.associatedcontent.com/arficle/26100/paparazzi-photographers-who-stalk-celebrities.
html.
196. Id.
197. See supra Part I.
198. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
199. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975).
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977).
201. Bill Analysis: Hearing on Assem. B. 524, supra note 23 (statement of Assem. Speaker
Karen Bass).
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judges like Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Kozinski "want to know." 2
0 2
Some people blame celebrities for attracting the paparazzi by
purposefully courting the press and manufacturing scandals to achieve
203greater notoriety. Furthermore, without paparazzi, "many stars would
have no public exposure-a necessary element of any stardom." 204 The
California Supreme Court noted that "consent to an impending intrusion
can 'inhibit reasonable expectations of privacy."' 25  Thus, a court will
rarely hold a defendant liable for photographing someone who is walking
in public because appearance in public is viewed as a form of voluntarily
206consent. In many ways, celebrities impliedly consent to be
photographed in public when they hire publicists because a publicist's
primary job is to generate press for the client. 207 These publicists often call
ahead to alert the press of their clients' whereabouts to increase their
clients' exposure and marketability. 208 Therefore, when a paparazzo
captures a public figure engaging in an otherwise personal activity after the
public figure voluntarily sought personal publicity, the paparazzo should be
able to exercise his or her First Amendment right to capture tabloid-like
information about the public figure's personal life, free from the fear of
criminal liability. The ordinance proposed above includes a provision that
exempts a photographer from guilt if the photographed "public figure"
gives express or implied consent. 209
The First Amendment precludes limitations on speech where
newsworthiness and public interest are attached to the events captured in a
photograph and the activity captured in the photograph relates to the past
public conduct. 210 If public figures affirmatively thrust their personal lives
into the public eye and use their personas to further their personal causes,
these same celebrities cannot later argue that their personal lives deserve to
be private, especially while they are in public. 211 Moreover, as discussed
202. Eastwood v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1250 (9th Cir. 1997).
203. Kelly, supra note 101.
204. Feig, supra note 195.
205. Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1077 (Cal. 2009) (quoting Hill v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 655 (Cal. 1994)).
206. See Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d at 648 ("If voluntary consent is
present, a defendant's conduct will rarely be deemed 'highly offensive to a reasonable person' so
as to justify tort liability.").
207. Kelly, supra note 101.
208. See id.; see also Feig, supra note 195.
209. See supra Part I.
210. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341, 346 (1974); see Virgil v. Time, Inc.,
527 F.2d 1122, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 1975) (adopting "the Restatement's standard for
newsworthiness").
211. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.
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above, "newsworthiness" is a complete defense under California law-a
total bar to liability. 212 In the communities of Los Angeles, Malibu and
Santa Monica, the customs and conventions dictate that celebrity
photographs are generally newsworthy. 213
Here, First Amendment protections afforded to the press outweigh
state privacy concerns, such as maintaining public safety and protecting
residential privacy. In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Supreme
Court held that if the press "lawfully obtains truthful information about a
matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally
punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order." 114  Therefore, it logically follows that
municipalities-such as Los Angeles, Malibu and Santa Monica-cannot
punish those who lawfully photograph celebrities in public without proving
an overriding compelling government interest (i.e., strict scrutiny). 215
Additionally, the Smith Court noted in dicta that when journalists are
relying upon "routine newspaper reporting techniques," such as picture-
taking, a government cannot constitutionally punish the media if a court
deems the privacy interests advanced are less substantial than the
competing First Amendment rights. 216 Photography is, indisputably, a
journalist's most routine technique for capturing valuable information to
deliver timely and accurate news to the public. Likewise, as the California
Supreme Court noted in Shulman, a camera is an "indispensable tool" for
newsgathering. 217 Therefore, on a Los Angeles public sidewalk where
celebrities have no reasonable expectation of privacy, a photograph of a
public figure is protected by the First Amendment as newsworthy.
212. Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1208 (Cal. 2007). But see Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167-68 (1979) ("A libel defendant must show more than mere
newsworthiness to justify application of the demanding burden of New York Times.").
213. But see Michaels v. Internet Entm't Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 840 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (upholding injunction to prevent dissemination of Pamela Anderson Lee's famous sex tape,
holding that the fact that Lee played roles in film and television involving sex and sexual appeal
"does not.. . make her real sex life open to the public").
214. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
215. Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1073 (Cal. 2009) (noting that "in the rare
case in which a 'fundamental' right of personal autonomy is involved," a defendant must "present
a 'compelling' countervailing interest"); see also full discussion on the applicable level of First
Amendment scrutiny infra Part IV.
216. Smith, 443 U.S. at 103--04 (noting that the newspaper "relied upon routine newspaper
reporting techniques to ascertain the identity of the alleged assailant .... If [such] information is
lawfully obtained... the state may not punish its publication except when necessary to further an
interest [that is] more substantial"); cf Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir.
1971) (upholding an intrusion claim against reporters who used a hidden camera and hidden
recording devices, because such devices were not "'indispensable tools' of newsgathering").
217. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc. 955 P.2d 469, 496 (Cal. 1998).
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IV. THE PROPOSED ANTI-PAPARAZZI ORDINANCES IN THE Los ANGELES
AREA REGULATE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED CONTENT-BASED
EXPRESSION
Even if Los Angeles area anti-paparazzi ordinances do not violate the
First Amendment on freedom of press grounds, the laws are likely to be
impermissible content-based regulations. As a threshold matter, it is clear
that the First Amendment protects photography as a form of expression,
assuming the photographs do not include unprotected forms of speech. 2 8
Furthermore, while state or local governments may regulate certain areas of
unprotected speech, 219 it is axiomatic that "content-based regulations are
presumptively invalid." 220 A long line of precedent has applied "the most
exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose
differential burdens upon speech because of its content." 
221
A. Regulations that Require Examination of a Photograph to Determine
Guilt or Innocence Are Inherently Content-Based
The principal inquiry for a court to determine if a regulation is
content-based is whether the government adopted a regulation based on
hostility or favoritism towards the underlying message expressed. 222 Here,
all available evidence suggests that the City of Los Angeles is considering
the anti-paparazzi law in order to curb the serious hazard to public safety
caused by increasingly aggressive paparazzi. 223 Thus, Councilman Zine
does not appear to have any specific hostility towards the message
expressed in the celebrity photographs. However, as the Supreme Court
noted in Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., even if the proposed ordinances are
not directed at activity with an expressive component, and if, instead, they
"impose a disproportionate burden upon those engaged in protected First
Amendment activities," the laws should nonetheless be treated as
presumptively unconstitutional. 224 Therefore, if a law targets a substantial
218. See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973) (noting that the First
Amendment protects pictures, films, paintings, drawings and engravings, assuming they are not
obscene).
219. For instance, the Court has held that the following forms of expression receive no First
Amendment protection: obscenity, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); fighting words,
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); and child pornography, New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
220. RA. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
221. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
222. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
223. E.g., Motion from Dennis P. Zine, supra note 14.
224. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 703-04 (1986).
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amount of protected activity-here, newsgathering and photography-a
court should subject the law to heightened First Amendment scrutiny. 
225
The proposed ordinance discussed above includes a subject matter
provision that is likely to mirror the actual city proposals. Therefore, a
court would be required to determine first, as a matter of law, whether a
photographed person qualified as a "public figure" under defamation law.
To make such a determination, a court would consider whether the person
captured in the photograph affirmatively thrust himself into the limelight,
and is therefore deemed "newsworthy." 226 Then it would be up to the fact-
finder to decide whether the public figure was engaged in a "personal or
familial activity" when the photograph was taken. In each case, the judge
and jury will have to examine the content of the photograph in order to
determine whether the defendant is guilty. Thus, an ordinance that imposes
criminal liability on a person who photographs a public figure engaged in
personal activities and does not impose liability on a person who
photographs a private figure is inherently content-based. As the Supreme
Court noted in Regan v. Time, Inc., a regulation that purports to determine
the newsworthiness of a photograph "cannot help but be based on the
content of the photograph." 
227
Photographs have unparalleled "expressive, communicative, and
informative value.", 228  Moreover, "[a] photographer's ability to take a
picture depends upon freedom of access to the place where the subject is
located, as well as the freedom to capture an image at the right time." 229
Therefore, "[r]egulations that target photography directly curtail the ability
of photographers to communicate their messages to others." 23 0 The First
Amendment neither permits the government to restrict private individuals'
expressive activity based upon the idea the activity expresses, nor does it
allow the government to discriminate based on the expressions' content.231
225. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592-
93 (1983) (holding that "[a] tax that singles out the press, or that targets individual publications
within the press, places a heavy burden on the State to justify its action"); see also Hernandez v.
Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1073 (Cal. 2009) (noting that "in the rare case in which a
'fmdamental' right of personal autonomy is involved," a defendant must "present a 'compelling'
countervailing interest"); see also supra Part.IlI.B.
226. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); see also Sidis v. F-R
Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940); cf Dendy, supra note 176, at 160-61 (noting that
the majority of jurisdictions consider newsworthiness a question of fact to be decided by the
jury).
227. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648 (1984).
228. Note, Privacy, Photography, and the Press, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1095 (1998).
229. Id. at 1096.
230. Id.
231. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.,
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Such restrictions "rais[e] the specter that the Government may effectively
drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace." 232
While not every law that interferes with speech triggers the same
degree of First Amendment scrutiny, a state's right to limit expression is
"sharply circumscribed" in traditional public forums such as public
sidewalks. 233 In such cases, a court must strictly scrutinize the law to
determine whether it violates the First Amendment.234 Thus, a
municipality such as Los Angeles may not enforce a content-based
exclusion unless it shows that "its regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve -that
end." 235
B. Los Angeles Has Compelling Interests, but Anti-Paparazzi Ordinances
Must Be Narrowly Tailored and Clearly Defined
Here, Councilman Zine described the City's interests in passing an
anti-paparazzi ordinance. "What the paparazzi have done," according to
Zine, "is develop[] a lawless society where the rules don't apply." 236 Zine
argued that paparazzi pose "a clear danger not only to the people they are
trying to photograph, but to the general public around them.,
237
Additionally, he noted that "[p]aparazzi swarms are more than a simple
inconvenience to celebrities. On the contrary, these hoards of
photographers many times block entrances to vital public service centers
such as hospitals and courthouses. Private enterprise also suffers when
paparazzi impede access to offices, shops, and restaurants."238
In late 2008, Councilman Zine led a three-and-a-half-hour hearing at
Los Angeles City Hall with an ad hoc panel of elected officials from Los
Angeles and surrounding areas to discuss problems associated with the
paparazzi. 239 Those who spoke to the panel-including Grammy Award-
winning singer-songwriter John Mayer-requested additional paparazzi
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
232. Turner, 512 U.S. at 641 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
233. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see
Turner, 512 U.S. at 642.
234. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
235. Id.
236. Britney Spears Inspires a New Law, supra note 13 (quoting Councilman Dennis Zine).
237. Motion from Dennis P. Zine, supra note 14.
238. Id.
239. Curb Paparazzi? No, Insists L.A.'s Top Cop, CBSNEwS, Aug. 1, 2008,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/08/01 /earlyshow/leisure/celebspot/main43 12875.shtml
[hereinafter Curb Paparazzi].
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regulation.24° Other speakers "complained of 'swarms' and 'herds' of
paparazzi pursuing celebrities at high speeds along winding, secluded
roads, paying scant regard to road signs. 241  One Beverly Hills police
lieutenant complained that some photographers abandon their cars in the
middle of streets to pursue their subjects. 242 Other officials argued that
"existing fines were not steep enough to deter photographers who can make
six-figure amounts on a single picture and see the penalties as a cost of
doing business. 243 However, it was Councilman Zine's remarks to the
press that best summed up his personal motivation for introducing the anti-
paparazzi regulation. "[It cost] $25,000 dollars to take an ambulance with
Britney Spears to the hospital," said Councilman Dennis Zine. 244 "Tax
payers paid for that." 
245
In June 2009, Santa Monica City Councilman Richard Bloom visited
the preschool where actors Ben Affleck and Jennifer Garner brought their
three-year-old daughter. 246 He was disturbed by the chaotic paparazzi
situation that he witnessed, noting that "preschoolers are just a little too
vulnerable to be collateral damage in the world of paparazzi." 247 One non-
celebrity parent who had to drop off her four-year old amidst the paparazzi
frenzy caused by the presence of the celebrities' daughter said, "I
understand [the paparazzi] have to make a living .... and I understand this
is what the public wants-to see these pictures-but I think there should be
certain parameters when it comes to kids." 248
Any court will likely consider all of these concerns to be compelling
government interests. However, the more serious hurdle in creating an
anti-paparazzi law that passes constitutional muster relates to three
separate, but related, speech doctrines: (1) overbreadth; (2) vagueness; and
(3) narrow tailoring.
1. Overbreadth
In the area of First Amendment rights, "[p]recision of regulation must
be the touchstone" because the amendment "so closely touch[es] our most
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Britney Spears Inspires a New Law, supra note 13 (quoting Councilman Dennis Zine).
245. Id. (quoting Councilman Dennis Zine).
246. Hall, supra note 16, at A3.
247. Id. (quoting Councilman Richard Bloom).
248. Id.
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precious freedoms. 249  The overbreadth doctrine is based upon the
supposition that over-sweeping laws that regulate speech may violate the
First Amendment when they "chill" speakers who have a legitimate right to
speak but are afraid that the law would be used against them. 250 When a
party challenges a statute on facial overbreadth grounds, a court must first
"determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct." 
251
Early reports indicate that the City of Los Angeles "is considering an
ordinance that would impose a 20-yard 'personal safety bubble' around...
'public figures.' 25 2 Councilman Zine said that the "buffer space must be
large enough to allow for safe vehicle and pedestrian traffic flow." 253 As
discussed above, the proposed city ordinances will prevent all people, not
just paparazzi, from capturing celebrity photographs in public, and will
target a substantial amount of news photography.254 Based on the Supreme
Court's holdings, 255 an anti-paparazzi ordinance that creates a personal
safety zone greater than eight feet likely will be deemed substantially
overbroad on its face because those individuals who want to exercise their
constitutionally protected First Amendment rights may refrain from doing
so rather than run the risk of liability. 256
In fact, the Supreme Court invalidated similar floating buffer zone
regulations for violating the First Amendment. 257 Although the Court
decided most of those cases in the context of abortion protest regulations,
the holdings also apply here because the asserted government interests
were substantially the same: "ensuring the public safety and order,"
"promoting the free flow of traffic on public streets and sidewalks," and
protecting "residential privacy. '2 58  Furthermore, while the Court has
upheld some "fixed" buffer zone regulations around establishments, it has
been less deferential when the government has tried to create "floating"
249. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
250. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965).
251. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982).
252. E.g., Hirsen, supra note 35; Wiehl, supra note 35; Harlow, supra note 35.
253. Motion from Dennis P. Zine, supra note 14.
254. See supra Part 1ILA-B.
255. Compare Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (invalidating a
three hundred-foot floating buffer zone), and Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357
(1997) (invalidating a fifteen-foot buffer zone), with Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000)
(upholding an eight-foot buffer zone).
256. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
257. E.g., Madsen, 512 U.S. at 776.
258. E.g., id. at 768; see also Motion from Dennis P. Zinc, supra note 14.
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buffer zones around individuals. 259
For instance, in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, the Court struck
down a fifteen-foot buffer zone, observing that such a broad "floating"
speech prohibition rendered the court order unsustainable. 260 Under the
buffer zone regulations proposed by Los Angeles and surrounding cities, a
member of the press who wishes to photograph a public figure in public
would have to "move as the individual moves," maintaining a specific
distance of separation. 26' In Schenck, the Court observed how difficult that
task is to accomplish and struck down a fifteen-foot floating buffer zone as
overbroad.262 Therefore, because Los Angeles area lawmakers are
restricted by the Schenck holding, they clearly cannot create floating
personal safety zones that measure fifteen or more feet in distance.
However, in Hill v. Colorado, the Supreme Court ruled six to three
that a Colorado law limiting protest, education, and distribution of
literature or counseling within eight feet of a person entering a health care
facility did not violate the First Amendment right to free speech. 263
Therefore, if the cities include floating buffer zone provisions in their anti-
paparazzi ordinances, Supreme Court precedent permits them to establish
eight-foot zones. 264 However, any distance greater than eight feet must
still be less than fifteen feet, or the provision will clearly violate the First
Amendment on grounds of overbreadth.
2. Vagueness
A law is unconstitutionally vague if it subjects the exercise of First
Amendment rights to an unascertainable standard such that a person "of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning." 265 Under the
proposed ordinance above, newsgatherers and tourists will have to guess
266who qualifies as a public figure under the laws governing defamation.
Tourists may be liable without fair notice that the law even exists and likely
will be ignorant as to who legally qualifies as a "public figure." A vague,
259. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768-70.
260. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377.
261. See id. at 377-78.
262. Id.
263. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 707, 734-35 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3)
(2000)).
264. See id. at 735.
265. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (quoting Connally v. Gen.
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
266. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); see also text accompanying
note 38.
2009]
168 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:133
content-based regulation "raises special First Amendment concerns because
of its obvious chilling effect on free speech." 2 67 Additionally, where, as
here, First Amendment rights are implicated, the Court is compelled to
"look even more closely" at a statute to ensure that freedom of speech or
press do not suffer, and strike down any law that is too general or
undefined. 268
Former LAPD Chief William Bratton best illustrated the vagueness
doctrine when he commented on Councilman Zine's proposal: "The idea
of trying to create a secure space around a celebrity-who's a celebrity?
You? Me? By some definition we all fit.... What is this protected space
that they are entitled to that the rest of us are not entitled to?" 269 Members
of the press and tourists may refrain from exercising their First Amendment
rights if they cannot ascertain how to comply with the cities' proposed
ordinances. This potential chilling effect will require the courts to strike
down any such law under the First Amendment.
However, the Supreme Court's holding in Hill suggests that a
personal buffer zone might survive a vagueness challenge if the law
includes a scienter requirement, thus only applying "to a person who
'knowingly' approaches within eight feet of another" with the intent to
capture a photograph. 270 Therefore, the proposed ordinance above includes
scienter provisions similar to the statute upheld in Hill. 271
Nevertheless, a law also may be unconstitutionally vague when it
"authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." 272 If the Malibu ordinance passes, how would a police
officer "distinguish between a local news reporter for the Malibu Times
who was [assigned to capture] a photo of the local surfing conditions for
the weather section of the newspaper and a paparazzo shooting Matthew
McConaughey surfing?" 273 Furthermore, would a public figure who has a
good relationship with the police receive greater enforcement protection
under the new laws than other celebrities? These are questions that Los
Angeles area cities must answer in order to draft a constitutional ordinance
that courts would not strike down as unconstitutionally vague. Experts
have noted that floating buffer zones, such as those proposed by Los
Angeles, Malibu and Santa Monica "could be difficult to enforce, but fixed
267. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997).
268. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1966).
269. City Hall Abuzz, supra note 3.
270. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 732 (emphasis added).
271. See supra Part I.
272. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 732.
273. Posting of Jason Crow, supra note 11.
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buffers around an individual's house or their child's school may be more
workable."274
3. Narrow Tailoring
Depending on the exact language of the cities' ordinances, a court
may analyze the laws as regulating content-based speech, expressive
conduct, or the time, place, or manner of speech. 275 Even if a court applies
only intermediate scrutiny, the O'Brien test, which courts apply to
expressive conduct regulations, "should be understood as a restraint on the
degree of seclusion the law may provide persons who are themselves
newsworthy, or who are involved in newsworthy events or issues." 
276
Additionally, the Supreme Court noted in Clark v. Community for Creative
Non- Violence that the intermediate scrutiny test applied to time, place, and
manner restrictions differs little from the O'Brien test applied to expressive
conduct restrictions.277
Several legal scholars have argued that anti-paparazzi laws should be
subject to strict scrutiny review because such laws "significantly and
disproportionately" burden "media speech-related activity." 278 This much
is clear: no matter which level of heightened scrutiny a court applies, the
cities will be required to show that the laws are narrowly tailored to the
cities' asserted interests. 279
Councilman Zine specifically notes that chief among the city's
compelling interests is to prevent "hoards of photographers [from]
block[ing] entrances to vital public service centers such as hospitals and
274. Curb Paparazzi, supra note 239; see also supra notes 259-64 and accompanying text.
275. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (laying down the test for
expressive conduct); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 798-99 (1989) (quoting
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)) (describing the time, place,
or manner regulation test); see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 45-46 (1983) (discussing narrow tailoring as an element in the public forum doctrine for
content-based exclusions, expressive conduct regulations, and regulations of the time, place, or
manner of speech) (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981)).
276. 3 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 24:6 (2009)
(discussing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
277. Clark, 468 U.S. at 298.
278. E.g., C. Thomas Dienes, Protecting Investigative Journalism, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1139, 1146 (1999) (citing Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 703-04 (1986)); see also
Smolla, supra note 30, at 1113 ("The anti-paparazzi laws are manifestly content-based laws,
because they contain as a predicate element the perpetrator's intent to sell or transfer
communicative material. As content-based laws, they are presumptively unconstitutional.").
279. See supra notes 90-91, 93-94, 126, 214-15, 218-21, 224-25, 227, 233-35, 275, 278
and accompanying text.
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courthouses." 280 Therefore, in order for Los Angeles to narrowly tailor its
anti-paparazzi ordinance and comply with the fixed one hundred-foot
radius provision in Hill, the city's ordinance should only apply "in the
public way or sidewalk area within a radius of one hundred feet from any
entrance door to a health care facility," courthouse (or school). 281
Imagine for a moment what a celebrity photographer will have to do
to comply with the proposal above, and then ask whether the law will
remedy the cities' asserted interests. A personal safety zone that complies
with Supreme Court precedent will be somewhere between one and
fourteen feet, and only will apply within one hundred feet of essential
public facilities such as hospitals or schools. Unfortunately, a fourteen-foot
distance will not significantly deter the paparazzi from following
celebrities, nor will the law prevent paparazzi-related accidents. In fact,
crowds may spill out on the street as photographers struggle to maintain
and measure a lawful distance. In Schenck, the Court struck down a
floating buffer zone under the First Amendment, noting how difficult it
would be for protesters trying to communicate with individuals to "move as
the individual moves," maintaining several feet of separation.282
Therefore, if Los Angeles, Malibu or Santa Monica successfully enact anti-
paparazzi ordinances with similar floating buffer zone provisions, the press
will be similarly challenged, compelling any court to strike down the laws
for the same reasons.
V. CONCLUSION
"Complete privacy does not exist in this world except in a desert, and
anyone who is not a hermit must expect and endure the ordinary incidents
of the community life of which he is a part."283 This truism is quoted from
the Restatement's commentary on the privacy tort known as "publicity
given to private life." 284 Most Americans today have a lower expectation
of privacy in public now that there are security cameras in stores, subway
stations, schools, parks and ordinary street comers in cities all over the
285country. Thus, an ordinary reasonable person must expect the "casual
observation of his neighbors.., and that his comings and goings and his
280. Motion from Dennis P. Zinc, supra note 14.
281. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707 n.1 (2000).
282. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 377-78 (1997).
283. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. c (1977).
284. Id. § 652D.
285. See Adam Goodheart, Op-Ed., Public Cameras Accost Privacy, USA TODAY, July 22,
2002, at I 1A (describing the increasing use of video surveillance in Washington, D.C. and
worldwide).
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ordinary daily activities, will be described in the press as a matter of casual
interest to others."286
California's anti-paparazzi tort, Civil Code Section 1708.8, has been
on the books for ten years, but has not formed the basis for many legitimate
claims. In 2009, state Assembly Speaker Karen Bass (D-Los Angeles)
introduced an amendment to the statute because of "the increasing tension
between celebrities and photographers, which at times have escalated to the
point of physical confrontations."287 The amendments to Section 1708.8,
signed into law in October 2009, seek "to increase privacy protections for
individuals by broadening [the law's] reach., 288  Effective, January 1,
2010, any person in California who sells, transmits, publishes, or
broadcasts a photograph with actual knowledge that the photograph was
sold, or otherwise unlawfully obtained, will also be liable under Section
1708.8.289 The new amendments also allow prosecutors to bring civil
actions in the name of the individual whose privacy rights have been
allegedly violated. 290 Furthermore, the amended tort now authorizes any
California city or county to levy "civil fines" up to $50,000 against those
who violate the law. 291
Even before the 2009 amendments, critics argued that California Civil
Code Section 1708.8 was "legislative overkill" and violated the First
Amendment. 292 Several groups, including the American Civil Liberties
Union, California Broadcasters Association, and California Newspaper
Publishers Association, were among those who opposed the new measure
on First Amendment grounds. 293 The press, however, has never challenged
the law in court. Nevertheless, the City of Los Angeles and the
surrounding cities of Malibu and Santa Monica are seeking to enact
additional criminal ordinances that run a greater risk of infringing on First
Amendment rights. As discussed above, although the First Amendment
286. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. c; see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 388 (1967) ("Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life
in a civilized community.").
287. Bill Analysis: Hearing on Assem. B. 524, supra note 23 (statement of Assem. Speaker
Karen Bass); see Assem. B. 524, 2009-10 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_0501-
0550/ab_524_bill_20090916_enrolled.html.
288. Bill Analysis: Hearing on Assem. B. 524, supra note 23 (statement of Assem. Speaker
Karen Bass); Schwarzenegger Signs Tougher Paparazzi Law, supra note 169.
289. Cal. Assem. B. 524.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Dienes, supra note 278, at 1140; see also Smolla, supra note 30, at 1110.
293. Patrick McGreevy, BillAims to Curb Paparazzi Activity, L.A. TIMES, July, 15, 2009, at
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narrowly permits state defamation laws to regulate false malicious speech
published about public figures, well-established jurisprudence simply does
not authorize regulations that target those who lawfully gather truthful,
public information. 294
Councilman Zine admitted that "the City of Los Angeles must respect
the First Amendment rights of the press." 295 Nevertheless, he incorrectly
believes that "the interests of public safety must remain paramount."296 As
explained above, Los Angeles, Malibu and Santa Monica will find it very
difficult to draft ordinances that do not violate the First Amendment. How
can photographers possibly know where cities want them to draw the line
between public and private activities when celebrities themselves do not
know where to draw the line? In order to illustrate this problem, this author
attempts to draft an ordinance based on existing jurisprudence, and
concludes that an ordinance that is narrowly tailored to comply with the
Constitution invariably will not remedy the cities' alleged paparazzi
problems.
Unfortunately, Los Angeles Councilman Zine is not interested in
hearing any opposing views on the matter: "I'm not here to debate the
issue ... !" yelled Zine. 297 "If someone wants to challenge it in court, they
can challenge it in court. We're not going to be intimidated by someone
who doesn't like it." 
298
Former LAPD Chief Bratton said in retort: "What we need is Britney
Spears to stay home instead of traipsing all over town. That would solve
the problem. We don't need additional laws.... I've got laws coming out
my ears to deal with this issue." 299 Even Councilman Zine recognized that
there are multiple laws on the books that already address the issue of
paparazzi harassment; he provided the solution in his own motion: "[A]ny
existing laws that address the dangerous aspects of paparazzi frenzies, such
as reckless driving, must be consistently applied so there is a clear message
that the law applies to everyone." 300 Los Angeles and Malibu do not need
additional laws; the police simply need to write the paparazzi the tickets
294. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1972); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449
F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971); Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940); Gill
v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441,444 (Cal. 1953).
295. Motion from Dennis P. Zine, supra note 14.
296. Id.
297. Ferrell, supra note 4 (quoting Councilman Dennis Zinc).
298. Id. (quoting Councilman Dennis Zine).
299. LAPD Chief: "What We Need Is Britney Spears To Stay Home, " HUFFINGTON POST,
Feb. 21, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/02/21/lapd-chief-what-we-
need n_87828.html (quoting former LAPD Chief William Bratton).
300. Motion from Dennis P. Zine, supra note 14.
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they deserve. Frankly, the First Amendment does not countenance any
further government action.

